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I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the large number of cases decided in the area
of practice and procedure, and the wide scope covered by
these cases, the authors have divided the cases into three
broad fields: pre-trial matters, matters arising during trial,
and matters arising on appeal. Each field has been further
sub-divided into topics presented by the cases decided. The
authors recognize that some cases deal with matters that con-
cern more than one of the broad fields, and consequently
such cases have been discussed more than one time. Also,
some principles enunciated do not clearly fall within any one
sub-division, and with respect to these the authors have dis-
cussed the cases under the topic which seems most logical to
them.
II. PRE-TRIAL MATTERS
A. Demurrer
In order to overrule a demurrer to a declaratory judg-
ment suit, it is only necessary to show a justiciable con-
troversy. Of course, where the complaint has no allegations
to show that plaintiff has rights to be adjudicated, the de-
murrer will be sustained. But where it is shown that plain-
tiff is entitled to a declaration of his rights, the court should
overrule the demurrer. Plenge v. Russell' involved this prin-
ciple and arose out of a suit by certain doctors seeking to
have certain hospital regulations declared contrary to stat-
utory law and unconstitutional. The defendant hospital de-
murred, and the circuit court sustained the demurrer, ap-
parently concluding that the regulations were consonant with
the statute and constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed,
citing the above principles, and holding in effect that the
case was decided prematurely.
In Costas v. Florence Publishing Company2 the Court
reaffirmed its oft-repeated holding that in passing on a de-
murrer factual allegations of the complaint are deemed true,
although legal conclusions are not. After the demurrer was
overruled and while the case was on appeal, the trial judge
permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint. The Supreme
Court held this was in error, stating that the judge might
1. Plenge v. Russell, 236 S. C. 473, 115 S. E. 2d 177 (1960).
2. Costas v. Florence Publishing Co., 237 S. C. 655, 118 S. E. 2d
696 (1961).
2
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require a case to be tried where the overruling of the de-
murrer was on appeal if the ends of justice required it, but
that principle was not involved in this case, since the judge
only permitted an amendment.
B. Venue
The often confusing subject of venue was the subject of
several cases in the Supreme Court's 1960 term. In Seegars
v. WIS-TV 3 the Court discussed the phrase "transacting busi-
ness" within the meaning of the rule that a domestic cor-
poration must own property and transact business within
a county in order to be subject to suit in that county.
There, the defendant WIS-TV owned property in Kershaw,
and affidavits of plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion
to change venue to Richland showed that defendant had car-
ried advertisements of Kershaw County firms over its tele-
vision programs. The circuit judge ordered the venue
changed. The Supreme Court, noting that the plaintiff's
affidavits did not show who, if anyone, solicited the adver-
tisements or how the solicitation, if any, was accomplished,
said that the advertisements alone were not enough to prove
that defendant "transacted business" in the County and that
the circuit judge's finding was "not without evidentiary sup-
port." Although Esso Standard Oil Company, which did own
property and transact business in Kershaw, had been joined
as a defendant, the circuit court held that Esso was "not such
a material bona fide defendant as to permit its joinder.., to
deprive... WIS-TV of the right to trial in Richland County."
This ruling, unappealed from, became the law of the case and
was not considered on appeal.
In Deese v. Williams4 the plaintiff joined the South Caro-
lina Highway Department and a resident of another county
and sued in plaintiff's county. The individual defendant
moved to change the venue, which the circuit judge denied.
The court affirmed, saying that the South Carolina Highway
Department, a bona fide defendant, could be sued in any
county of the State and that the individual defendant had
no absolute right to have the venue changed when the De-
partment was joined as a defendant.
3. Seegars v. WIS-TV, 236 S. C. 355, 114 S. E. 2d 502 (1960).
4. Deese v. Williams, 236 S. C. 292, 113 S. E. 2d 823 (1960).
[Vol. l
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In Collins v. Collins5 the Court interpreted Section 20-106
of the 1952 Code to permit venue for divorce in plaintiff's
county where there had been "due diligence" in trying to find
defendant in his county and he could not be found. This re-,
sult seems clearly to be required by the language of the stat-
ute.
C. Discovery
In an important discovery case, Wallace v. Timmons," the
Court permitted the receiver of an insurance company to
inspect books and papers of a deceased agent in order to ob-
tain relevant evidence in its suit against the widow for
premiums collected by the agent during his life. The Court
said the movant need only show, prima facie, that he has
a cause of action and that the records he seeks contain rele-
vant information. This may be shown by the verified com-
plaint, with or without supporting affidavits. In a strong
statement supporting discovery, the Court said, "Hide-and-
seek is not a game for the Courts; and discovery under Sec-
tions 26-502 and 26-503 is no longer to be regarded as an
extraordinary process." 7
D. Pleadings
The form of motions to strike was briefly mentioned in
Kinard v. United Insurance Co. of America." There, defendant
moved to strike all references to benefits under an insurance
policy where the action was for fraudulent cancellation of
the policy. The Court pointed out that it was not proper for
the motion to fail to specify which portions of the complaint
defendant wanted to have stricken. But, in considering the
case on its merits, the Court held that since the allegations
were material to the issues involved, they should not have
been stricken.
In Hunter v. Hyder9 the Court stated that the proper
function of pleadings is to apprise the adversary of the plead-
er's theory of the case. In line with that, the Court required
the plaintiff in Seegars v. WIS-TV10 to specify the substance
5. Collins v. Collins, 237 S. C. 230, 116 S. E. 2d 839 (1960).
6. Wallace v. Timmons, 237 S. C. 411, 117 S. E. 2d 567 (1960).
7. Id. at 117 S. E. 2d 573.
8. Kinard v. United Insurance Co. of America, 237 S. C. 266, 116
S. E. 2d 906 (1960).
9. Hunter v. Hyder, 236 S. C. 378, 114 S. E. 2d 493 (1960).
10. Supra, note 3.
4
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of defendant's broadcast alleged to have been defamatory.
And in Hunter, the Court held that in a suit against a prin-
cipal it was not necessary to allege that the acts complained
of (trespass) were in fact committed by agents of the prin-
cipal. The Court said that since the answer affirmatively
alleged that the persons who may have committed the acts of
trespass were independent contractors, the defendant was
not surprised and would not have been better informed by
clearer allegations in the complaint.
In Seegars the Court affirmed an order striking the ad-
jectives "large" and "powerful" in referring to the defendant,
permitting "wealthy" to stand since punitive damages were
sought. In this case also, the Court held that orders making
pleadings more definite and certain were appealable only
when the appellant is deprived of some substantial right.
E. Orders of Reference
In Clelland v. Lanham" the Court refused to order a ref-
erence in a suit on an account, just because the account and
offsets might be long. A long account is not necessarily com-
plicated, and the pleadings did not show that the accounting
would be complicated. Ordinarily a case seeking recovery
of a specific amount of money is triable by a jury.
III. MATTERs ARISING DURING TRIAL
A. Use of Testimony in Proceedings at Former Trial
In Bennett v. Floyd,12 a suit to question the validity of a
former partition and judicial sale whereby the heirs (plain-
tiffs) had been divested of their interest, the plaintiffs in-
troduced the judgment roll in the partition proceeding. The
defendant used the judgment roll to establish the fact of the
decease of one James Bradshaw prior to the partition. Plain-
tiffs produced two witnesses who testified he died subse-
quently to the hearing. These witnesses testified from mem-
ory. The Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of
the referee's report which upheld the validty of the sale.
The Court stated:
This testimony is contradicted by that given in the
partition proceeding which was to the effect that James
11. Clelland v. Lanham, 236 S. C. 351, 114 S. E. 2d 328 (1960).
12. Bennett v. Floyd, 237 S. C. 64, 115 S. E. 2d 659 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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Bradshaw died prior to the commencement of the action.
The testimony in that proceeding can properly be con-
sidered in determining the factual issue now raised. The
judgment roll in the partition suit was offered in evi-
dence by the appellants without qualification or restric-
tion. Under these circumstances, it must be treated as
admitted generally, as applicable to any issue it tended
to prove, and the contents thereof available to either
party to this action.' s
B. Contempt of Court
In State v. Langley14 the defendant was held in contempt of
court for violating order restraining him from the sale of
alcoholic beverages. Defendant appealed, among others,
upon the grounds the restraining order was broader than the.
statute allowed. The Court in upholding the contempt citation
quoted State v. Natha.ns :1'
The disobedience of any order, judgment or decree of'
court having jurisdiction to issue it, is a contempt of that:
court, however erroneous or improvident the issuing of it.
may have been. Such order is obligatory until reversed.
by an appellate court, or until corrected or discharged by-
the court which made it. But if, in making such order,.
the court was without jurisdiction, disobedience of it is.
not contempt.'(
In Johnson v. S. C. State Hwy. Dept.,17 involving con--
demnation proceedings, the land was offered for viewing by-
the respondent, Highway Department. No express objectiom
was made by the plaintiff.
The Court held that it was discretionary with the trial:
judge whether he would allow viewing of the premises under-
Section 38-202 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina,.
and in the absence of abuse of discretion they would not inter-
fere. They said that in any event no real objection had been.
made.
13. Id. at 237 S. C. 72.
14. State v. Langley, 236 S. C. 263, 113 S. E. 2d 786 (1960).
15. State v, Nathans, 49 S. C. 199, 27 S. E. 52 (1896).
16. State v. Langley, 236 S. C. 263, 269 (1960).
17. Johnson v. State Highway Department, 236 S. C. 424, 114, S. B_
2d 591 (1960).
1962] 17'7
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C. Scintilla Rule
In Williams v. Clinton's'the Court reiterated and reaffirm-
ed the scintilla rule and rejected the res ipsa loquitur rule.
The Court quoted from Waring v. South Carolina Power Co. :19
The appellant labors under the erroneous idea that the
Supreme Court has. overruled the pronounced principle,
to wit, if there is any relevant testimony, amounting to
a scintilla, it must be left to the jury to determine its
force and effect. The meaning of this rule is there must
be some evidence arising out of the testimony which
elucidates the issues of fact and which enables the jury
to form an intelligent conclusion. It does not authorize
the admission of speculative theoretical or hypothetical
views.- It does not set aside the rule in this state. relating
to res ipsa loquitur, which doctrine does not prevail in
this state.... .Whilst adhering .to the scintilla rule, this
Court has recognized a rule supplemental to the scintilla
rule which is thus propounded in this case of National
BZdfk o6. Thomas J. Barrett, 174 S. E. 581. 'If it be con-
ceded there may be deduced by a process of unusual
finesse of reasoning that there is a scintilla of evidence
. . . -nevertheless there is another rule, more founded
upon common sense and reason, to the effect that only
when one reasonable inference, not just one inference,
but one reasonable inference, can be deduced from the
evidence, it becomes a question of law for the Court and
not a question of fact for the jury.'
He concludes by stating:
"This declaration is but to say that the scintilla of
evidence upon which the case should be sent to the jury
must be real material and pertinent and relevant evi-
dence, 'not speculative and theoretical deductions."
D. Duty of Parties to Bring Litigation to Timely Trial
Is there a duty upon:the defendant to bring litigation to
trial? Our Supreme Court in Thomas & Howard v. Fowler"
said "No !"
The defendants, no less than the plaintiff, had had the right,
since Febiuary, 1955, when the controversies concerning the
18. Williams V. Clinton, 236 S; C. 373, 114 S.' E. 2d 490 (1960).
19. Waring v. South Carolina Power Co., 117 S. C. 295, 181 S. E. 1
20. Thomas & Howard v. Fowler, 238 S. C. 46, 119 S. E. 2d 591 (1961).
178 [Vol; 14
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pleadings were concluded, to press for trial; but the duty to
do so was the plaintiff's, not theirs. While a defendant may
bring about an expeditious trial of a case,- he has no legal
obligation to do so; except to meet such actions as are taken
by the plaintiff, he may remain passive. Schultz v. Schultz,
1945, 70 Cal. L. C. App. 2d 293, 161 P. 2d 36; Bock v. Port-
land Gas & Coke Co., 1954, 202 Or. 609, 277 P. 2d 758. 17 Am.
JUR., Dismissal,- etc., Section 80; 27 C. J. S. Dismissal and
Nonsuit § 65(4).
Nor does the assertion of a counterclaim relieve the plain-
tiff of the duty to bring the case to trial. In Wutchumuc
Water Co. v. Stevenson, 1928, 204 Cal. 191, 267 P. 537, the
court said: "Thip cause had been allowed to slumber for four
years and ten months or over, after the defendant's answer
had been filed, without any apparent effort on the part of the
plaintiff to bring the matter on for hearing. The fact that
the defendant had also appeared, seeking affirmative relief by
way of cross-complaint and counterclaim, did not serve to
relieve the plaintiff of the duty cast upon it to. promptly
prosecute its action...
E. Discretion of Trial Judge to' Grant New Trial. for In-
adequacy
In Fuller v. Bailey2 ' the Court reiterated the fact that it
was within the trial judge's discretion whether or not a new
trial should be granted for inadequacy. Repeating this well
defined rule the Court stated:
It is now well settled that in actions for torts, a new
trial may be granted by the Trial Judge in the exercise of
a just and wise judgment, upon the ground that the ver-
dict is grossly inadequate. DePass v. Broad River Power
Company, et al., 173 S. C. 387, 176 S. E. 325, 95 A. L. R.
545.
F.. Motion for New Trial on After-Discovered Evidence
In O'rtowski v. Ortowski22 defendant moved for a new trial
upon grounds of after-discovered evidence. -In affirming the
refusal of the trial judge to grant a new trial, the Court laid
down once again the five requirements which must be met by
the moving party in order to have a new trial on this ground:
21. Fuller v. Bailey, 237 S. C. 573, 118 S. E. 2d 340 (1961).
22. Ortowski v. Ortowski, 237 S. C. 499, 117 S. E..2d ,860 - (1961).
19621
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In a motion for a new trial based upon after-discovered
evidence, the moving party must show (1) that the evi-
dence is such as will probably change the result if a new
trial is granted, (2) that it has been discovered since the
trial, (3) that it could not have been discovered be-
fore the trial by the exercise of due diligence, (4) that it
is material to the issue, and (5) that it is not merely cum-
ulative or impeaching. McCabe v. Sloan, 184 S. C. 158,
191 S. E. 905. Such motions are addressed to the sound
discretion of the hearing Judge and his refusal will not
be interfered with by this Court unless an abuse of dis-
cretion amounting to error of law is shown. Evatt v.
Campbell, 234 S. C. 1, 106 S. E. 2d 447.
G. Burden of Proof - Circumstantial Evidence
The Fuller23 case also contains a thorough discussion of
the burden and requirements of proof of circumstantial evi-
dence. There is no direct evidence in the record that the ap-
pellant was driving the automobile in which the appellee was
injured at the time the accident occurred. The appellant con-
tended that there was, therefore, no proof from which it could
be reasonably concluded that he was operating the automobile
at the critical time. In disposing of this contention, the Court
said:
We think that the physical facts at the scene of the
wreck, and the attendant facts and circumstances, which
are circumstantial in nature, when considered in the light
most favorable to the respondent permit a reasonable
inference that the appellant was driving the automobile
at the time of the wreck ....
The respondent cites the annotation in 32 A. L. R. 2d
988, upon the subject or proof, in absence of direct tes-
timony by survivors or eyewitnesses, who, among oc-
cupants of motor vehicle, was driving it at time of acci-
dent. In this annotation we find the following statements:
'That one who was shown to be driving an automobile
shortly prior to an accident is presumed to have con-
tinued as driver was recognized in Flick v. Shimer
(1941), 340 Pa. 481, 17 A. (2d) 332, and Morgan v.
Peters (1942), 148 Pa. Super. 88, 24 S. (2d) 644, both
28. Supra, note 21.
[Vol. 14
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set out in para. 2, supra, and given effect not only in
those cases but in Claussen v. Johnson's Estate (1938),
224 Iowa 990, 278 N. W. 297; Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Lung
(1935), 129 Ohio St. 505, 196 N. E. 371; Renner v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., (1951 App.) 61 Ohio L. Abs. 298, 103
N. E. (2d) 832; and Huestis v. Lapham's Estate (1943),
113 Vt. 191, 32 A. (2d) 115.'
In the case of Leek v. New South Express Lines, 192 S. C.
527, 7 S. E. 2d 459, 462, this Court said:
The rule of criminal law that where circumstantial evi-
dence is relied upon, the facts proved must be such as
to preclude every other hypothesis but the guilt of the
accused, does not apply in civil cases. In civil actions
every other reasonable conclusion need not be excluded;
proof of circumstances warranting a given inference is
sufficient in such cases. Annotation, 97 Am. St. Rep. 802.
The right to recover on circumstantial evidence for
death resulting from another's negligence depends upon
the reasonable and logical connection such proof estab-
lishes between the death and the negligent act alleged to
have caused it. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff in
the absence of direct evidence, to show the existence
of such circumstances as would justify the inference that
the injury which caused the death was due to the wrong-
ful act of the defendant, and not leave the question to
mere speculation or conjecture. The facts and circum-
stances shown should be reckoned with in the light of
ordinary experience and such conclusions deduced there-
from as common sense dictates. 16 Am. Jur. Sec. 328,
Page 222.
H. Timely Objections
The Supreme Court in the case of Deese v. Williams2 4 was
asked to overrule the doctrine of allowing juries to apportion
damages between joint tort feasors in South Carolina.
The Court sidestepped this issue and refused to grant a
new trial stating that the defendant failed to make a timely
objection and thus any irregularity as to the form of the ver-
dict was waived:
24. Deese v. Williams, 237 S. C. 560, 118 S. E. 2d 330 (1961).
1962]
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... For the purpose of this case, we shall assume that
in a suit against several defendants on a joint tort, a
jury is not empowered to sever the actual damages and
assess each defendant according to the degree of his
culpability.
Even in those jurisdictions denying the power of the
jury to apportion damages between joint tort-feasors, it
is generally held that when a jury does so, the verdict is
not void but only erroneous in form. Whitney v. Tuttle,
178 Okl. 170, 62 P. 2d 508, 108 A. L. R. 789; Aitken v.
White, 93 Cal. App. 134, 208 P. 2d 788; 52 Am. JUR.,
Torts § 123. And when, as here, no objection is made
when such a verdict is published and counsel for all par-
ties acquiesce in its form, it is too late to make a com-
plaint after the jury is discharged. By failing to make
timely objections, the irregularity in the form of the
verdict is waived....
I. Verdict Contrary to Instruction
In Repass & Repass v. King Pontiac, 25 the Court held that
where the jury renders a verdict in plain violation of instruc-
tions from the trial judge, that the defendant's, King Pqntiac,
motion for a new trial should have been granted.
The Court refused to consider the exclusion of other evi-
dence stating that since the case was remanded for a new trial
that it was unnecessary to pass on the exclusion of such evi-
dence.
J. Failure to Charge
In the case of Green v. Bolen,20 there was some disagree-
ment over the proper rationale for the Court's decision that
there was no error committed by the trial judge in refusing
a charge requested by appellant. Mr. Justice Moss, speaking
for the majority of the Court, found that no error had been
committed because the requested charge did not relate to the
issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. The majority
opinion cited DuRant v. Stuckey, 221 S. C. 342, 70 S. E. 2d
473, to the effect that "sound legal principles, whether em-
braced in decisions of the Court or statutes, should be charged
by a trial judge only when applicable to the case on trial." In
25. Repass & Repass v. King Pontiac, 236 S. C. 363, 114 S. E. 2d
486 (1960).
26. Green v. Bolen, 237 S. C. 1, 115 S. E. 2d 607 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Oxner affirmed
on the ground that the charge was not timely having been
made after the judge had concluded his instructions to the
jury. Furthermore, the subject had been fully discussed by
the Court and counsel prior to the commencement of the
trial Judge's charge and no request, was made by the appel-
lant at that time. In Mr. Justice Oxner's opinion, the charge,
although not directly related to the issues raised by the plead-
ings, was related to matters of common knowledge and that
questions as to their applicability might easily arise during
the jury's deliberations. Therefore, it would not, in his opin-
ion, have been error to give the requested charge had it been
timely made.
IV. MATTERS ARISING ON APPEAL"
A. Law of the Case
In Jones v. Southern Railway Co.2 7 the jury had awarded
$35,000.00 actual damages to the plaintiff. The trial judge
granted a new trial nisi unless the plaintiff should .consent to
a remittitur of $10,000.00, which he did. Upon appeal by the
defendant, the Supreme Court reversed, finding as a matter
of law that the plaintiff was barred from recovery by his own
cQntributory negligence. The accident had occurred when thie
plaintiff struck the side of one of defendant's trains at a
crossing. The trial judge ruled the crossing statute inappli-
cable because of the distance that the engine had proceeded
beyond the crossing at the time that the collision occurred.28
The ruling was not challenged and was, therefore, the law
of the case. As a result, simple contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff defeated recovery. The Court sets
forth in the body of its opinion an admirable list and dis-
tingiishment of the many South Carolina crossing cases.
B. Scope of Review
In Lee v. Lee2 9 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the lower court granting a divorce to the plaintiff on
grounds of adultery. The matter had been determined by
him without reference. The court wisely restrained the scope
of its review, recognizing the advantages which a trial judge,
who has heard and seen the witnesses has in- the making of
27. 238 S. C. 27, 118 S. E. 2d 880 (1961).
28. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Section 58-743 (1952).
29. 237 S. C. 532, 118 S. E. 2d 171 (1961).
1962]
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factual determinations. In reviewing equity cases, the re-
-viewing court should not undertake a de novo review of the
-evidence, but rather should place upon the appellant the bur-
,den of convincing it that the trial judge erred in his findings
of fact.30
The case does raise two interesting and perplexing points.
First, does the rule set forth above apply only in cases where
the crucial issue is the credibility to be given to testimony?
The principal case suggests this to be the rule,3 1 and it must
be admitted that the trial judge is at his greatest advantage
when he must pick and choose between conflicting state-
ments by witnesses. Any lawyer, however, who has ex-
perienced the great difference between the impression de-
rived from and actual trial and the cold printed record or
transcript of that same testimony, will readily admit that the
trial judge also has an advantage in the added depths of
-meaning that testimony takes on by reason of its being
colored by facial expressions, gestures, etc. This is also a rea-
son for restraint in review, even in cases that do not directly
invoke questions of credibility.
Finally, it should be noted that this case involved a charge
,of adultery, which even in actions for divorce requires clear
and positive proof by the preponderance of the evidence.
3 2
'This higher standard of proof should not, it seems, affect
'the permissible scope of review and in the principal case the
court implicitly accepts this fact.
In Mitchell v. Smyser 33 the Court was presented with a case
more novel in its facts than in its law. The factual question
-for determination by the court below was "who was the lawful
wife of Wellington Perkins ... ." The Master and Circuit
Judge had concluded in favor of the respondent's predecessor
in interest. Characterizing the question as one of law, the
Court affirmed the decision below, stating that it was "not
at liberty to pass on conflicting evidence except ... for the
purpose of determining whether or not there is any evidence
warranting the factual conclusions reached by the Circuit
Judge."
30. Inabinet v. Inabinet, 236 S. C. 52, 113 S. E. 2d 66 (1960).
31. Evalt v. Campbell, 234 S. C. 1, 106 S. E. 2d 447 (1959); Meyerson
v. Malinaw, 231 S. C. 14, 97 S. E. 2d 88, 65 A. L. R. 2d 194 (1957).
32. Brown v. Brown, 215 S. C. 502, 56 S. E. 2d 330, 15 A. L. IM 2d
163 (1949).
33. 236 S. C. 332, 114 S. E. 2d 226 (1960).
[Vol. 14184
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The Supreme Court noted in three cases that it must re-
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the respon-
dent when an appeal is taken from the trial judge's refusal
to grant a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment n. o. v. or
alternatively a new trial.34 In both cases, the Court noted
that where there are conflicts in evidence or where more than
one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence,
the case must be submitted to the jury. Such questions as
whether a party is guilty of contributory negligence or whose
act proximately caused an injury are ordinarily for the jury
and rarely become a question of law for the court. One line
of cases wherein contributory negligence has been held to
be a question of law is in those instances where there has
been an admission of facts by the guilty party himself that
establishes contributory negligence.35
The "Two-Court" Rule in equity cases was repeated by the
Court in the case of Galphin v. Wells."8 "In such matters
where issues of fact are found by the Master (Referee) and
concurred in by the Circuit Judge, the factual findings will
not be disturbed unless such findings are without evidence
to support them or are against the clear preponderance there-
of."37 It is sometimes erroneously assumed that this rule con-
fers upon factual findings agreed upon by a referee and cir-
cuit judge the same limited review that prevails with regard to
jury determinations. The Court does not apply the rule in
this restrictive fashion, but undertakes a more extensive re-
view than would be permissible under South Carolina's so-
called "scintilla" rule that is applied in the review of a jury's
findings. Although the rule is time-honoured, it may in prac-
tice express nothing more than a truism to the effect that
joint findings of a referee and circuit judge should be en-
titled to great respect, especially in view of the fact that they
were able to view the witnesses, judge their credibility, etc. 38
It would be a mistake to confer too great restrictiveness on
34. West v. Sowell, 237 S. C. 641, 118 S. E. 2d 692 (1961); Green v.
Bolen, 237 S. C. 1, 115 S. E. 2d 667 (1960); Hucks v. Sellars, 236 S. C.
39, 113 S. E. 2d 753 (1960).
36. Selell v. Hyder, 229 S. C. 480, 93 S. E. 2d 637 (1956); Reese v.
National Surety Corp., 224 S. C. 489, 80 S. E. 2d 47 (1954); Sanders
v. State Highway Department, 212 S. C. 224, 47 S. E. 2d 306 (1948).
36. 236 S. C. 606, 115 S. E. 2d 288 (1960).
37. See also Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S. C. 9, 181 S. E. 897, 105
A. L. R. 102 (1935); Young v. Levy, 206 S. C. 1, 32 S. E. 2d 889 (1945).
38. See Lee v. Lee, 237 S. C. 532, 118 S. E. 2d 171 (1961), discussed
infra.
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this rule alone, but viewed as a logical extension of the Hol-
mesian principle of judicial restraint in review it may well
serve a useful purpose.
C. Matters Not Raised in Court Below
The Supreme Court of South Carolina on two separate
points, again stated its well established rule that it would not
consider questions which were not raised before the court
below and were not included as additional sustaining
grounds, Freeman v. King Pontiac Co.39
In the case of Carolina Amusement Co. v. Martin40 the
Supreme Court held that 'the State's Blue Laws were con-
stitutional. The Court refused to consider the question of
whether these Statutes denied equal protection of the laws
to the appellants, since this question was not passed upon
by the lower court and was not raised by any of the excep-
tions. 41
In an interesting case concerning the South Carolina "Right
-to-work" Law, the Court refused to pass upon the issue of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction as raised by demurrer, since the
trial court had not passed upon that issue, the demurrer hav-
ing been sustained on other grounds, Branham v. Miller
Electric Co.41
The case of Green v. Green,4 2 significant in the field of
trusts, also contains statements by the Court to the effect
that issues not passed upon by the trial judge are not properly
before the Court for review.
In McElmurray 'v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co.
43
the respondent was hoist upon his own petard. In the trial
court he had sought to establish his case upon an agency
relationship allegedly existing between his vendor and the
defendant. A part of his brief was addressed to the correct-
ness of, the decision below in this regard. In argument he
attempted to deny the agency relationship. The Court re-
fused to allow this reversal of precept, even though the argu-
39. Freeman v. King Pontiac Co., 236' S. C. 335, 114 S. E. 2d 478
(1960).
40. 236 S. C. 558, 115 S. E. 2d 273 (1960). See 81 Sup. Ct. 1914
wherein appeal from this case was dismissed by the United States
Supreme Court.
41. Branham v. Miller Electric Co., 237 S. C. 540, 118 S. E. 2d 167
(1961).
42.,237 S. C. 424, 117 S. E. 2d 583 (1960).
43. 236 S. C. 195, 113 S. E. 2d 528 (1960).
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ment could conceivably have been fitted into one of respon-
dent's. additional sustaining grounds. In any event, the entire
matter was concluded by a stipulation in which it was stated
that notice was given by the defendant to the plaintiff.
D. Abandonment of Exceptions
Gowan v. Thomas4 4 was a decision restating the South
Carolina rule that funeral expenses are not recoverable in
an action under the Survival Act.1 This accords with the
overwhelming majority view.46 The Court noted that ex-
ceptions which have not been argued will be treated as aban-
doned and will not be passed upon by the Court.
In an earlier case,4 7 the Court had held that under Supreme
Court Rule 8, Section 2, an exception not argued is deemed
abandoned.
E. Non-Prejudiciai Error
In the case of Childs v. Allstate Insurance Co.4 8 the Su-
preme Court refused to inquire into the propriety of certain
instructions by the trial judge because the Court felt that
the respondent was entitled to a directed verdict under the
undisputed facts. Any error would, therefore, have been non-
44. 237 S. C. 198, 116 S. E. 2d 761 (1960).
45. CODE OF LAWS OF SOuTH CAROLINA, Section 10-209 (1952).
46. See Arnot. 7 A. L. R. 1355, also Annot. 163 A. L. R. 253 at 260.
While there can be no question that the almost unanimous rule is in
accord, it has always seemed an anomaly to the author. The rule is
always rationalized on the basis that only damages which the decedent
could have recovered had he survived are properly recoverable under the
Survival Act. Obviously the decedent would have had no funeral ex-
penses had he survived, but it seems that the simplicity of this point
may have misled the majority of courts. In the principal case, the
Court passes the point with what almost amounts to flippancy but with
very little logic. It seems that the proper rationale would allow the
estate to recover for debts which it is responsible for. Clearly the assets
of the estate are liable for the funeral debts. Many interesting problems
arise 'if the question is considered in depth. For example, any recovery
under the Wrongful Death Act may not be reached by creditors of the
estate. If there has been a recovery under the Wrongful Death Act
including funeral expenses, could the undertaker reach this fund to
satisfy his bill if the estate is insolvent? Also, recovery under the Wrong-
ful Death Act is for the benefit of the designated statutory beneficiaries.
If the decedent has left a Will naming different beneficiaries, will the
share of the statutory beneficiaries or the share of the testamentary
beneficiaries be responsible for and lessened by the funeral expenses?
Will this be affected by the fact that recovery for funeral expenses is
proper only under the Wrongful Death Act? It seems to the author that
the recovery should belong to the party who will ultimately be respon-
sible therefor.
47. Hucks v. Sellars, 236 S. C. 239, 113 S. E. 2d 753 (1960), citing
Saxon v. Saxon, 231 S. C. 378, 98 S. E. 2d 803 (1957); State v. Hollman,
232 S. C. 489, 102 S. E. 2d 873 (1958).
48. 237 S. C. 455, 117 S. E. 2d 867 (1961).
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prejudicial. The Court cited the rule from Mitchell v. Leech49
to the effect that any error of the trial judge "was not pre-
judicial to the appellants, for his charge gave the jury the
opportunity of finding against the plaintiff upon a question
of fact that should not have been submitted to them."
F. Matters Appealable
In the case of Tate v. Oxner,50 the Supreme Court again
held that an order refusing to strike certain allegations from
the Complaint as irrelevant and redundant was not presently
appealable."' Two exceptions have been recognized to this
rule. When the motion to strike is in the nature of a demurrer,
the decision of the trial judge may be immediately appealed.
-5 2
The pleading in the principal case concededly contained re-
maining allegations which stated a cause of action and, there-
fore, this exception was not applicable. Such an order may
also be presently appealed where there is an independent ap-
pealable issue. 3 This exception is rationalized on the grounds
that it will prevent multiple and unnecessary appeals. It did
not apply in the present case. In dicta, the Court also re-
peated from an earlier decision to the effect that the adverse
decision of the trial judge on such a motion does not prevent
the moving party from efforts to exclude testimony in sup-
port of the questioned allegations, nor are his rights pre-
judiced thereby.
49. 69 S. C. 413, 48 S. E. 290, 66 L. R. A. 723 (1903).
50. 236 S. C. 313, 114 S. E. 2d 225 (1960).
51. See the earlier case of Sparks v. Dew and Sons, 230 S. C. 507, 96
S. E. 2d 488 (1957), and numerous cases cited therein.
52. Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 236 S. C. 95, 113 S. E. 2d 337
(1960). It should be noted that this exception applies even though a
separately stated cause of action is contained in the pleading. In such
cases, if the Motion to Strike is such that a favorable ruling thereon
would result in the dismissal or striking of any complete cause ,of ac-
tion in a pleading, its denial is the proper subject of an interlocutory
appeal.
53. DePass v. Piedmont interstate Fair Ass'n., 217 S. C. 38, 59 S. E.
2d 495 (1950), cited by the Court in the principal case is not absolutely
in point, since in that case the Court noted that ". . . the motion is in
the nature of a demurrer to a substantial portion of respondent's claim."
The leading modern authority in this State appears to be Rice Hope
Plantation v. S. C. Public Service Authority, 216 S. C. 500, 59 S. E. 2d
132 (1950), wherein the Court states, "[wle have here a single order
from a part of which an appeal admittedly will lie, but it is manifest
that the entire order should be considered upon this appeal . . . ." In
that case, however, the Court speaks of the necessity that all phases of
the order be passed upon to avoid confusion at trial and, further, that
the merits of the cause were involved in the order before the Court. It
would seem that if the rationale of this exception to the general rule
of non-appealibility is to prevent the necessity of multiple appeals, these
further requirements would not be necessary.
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